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Introduction 
A distinctive daily and Sunday Press is published in, or for, 
Scotland. This Press, hereafter referred to collectively as the 
"Scottish morning Press", regards itself as the guardian and 
recorder of Scottish political interests. Most of the papers took 
up positions on the question of a Scottish Assembly as proposed 
by the Scotland Act 1978 and regarded the campaign leading 
up to the referendum on 1 March 1979 as a major news story. 
This article sets out to describe the salient characteristics of the 
Scottish morning Press, to describe the way it handled the 
referendum, and to assess the possible effects of Press activity. 
The Scottish Morning Press: Its Existence and Composition 
Past commentators on Scottish affairs have tended to ignore 
the existence of a Scottish Press or have noted and described 
it without identifying its role. Writers on the development of 
nationalism invariably draw a connection with Scottish literature 
but usually exclude the mass literature which is actually read 
by most of those who make a nationalist revival possible, con-
centrating instead on minority literary tastes. There has recently 
been some attempt at redress. As one writer has warned: 
"Nobody can appreciate Scottish culture unless he reads 
(even if he cannot understand) the Sunday Post which is read 
by a staggering 77 per cent of the adult population of 
Scotland" .1 
The most recent Royal Commission on the Press found a 
higher percentage of morning paper readers among Scots than 
among other Britons.2 Moreover, different papers were read in 
Scotland from elsewhere in the UK. Penetration by the London 
Press is less extensive in Scotland, the readership of popular 
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Sundays is totally different and only the British quality Sundays 
maintain their market share, thanks to the lack of indigenous 
competition. Roughly four out of every five morning papers read 
in Scotland are published specifically for the Scottish morning 
market. 
The Scottish morning Press consists of nine titles: two 
quality dailies, circulating throughout Scotland; two popular 
tabloids covering the same area; two regional dailies covering 
respectively the Dundee and Aberdeen areas and their hinter-
lands, and three Sunday papers. 
The papers and their stance on devolution can be summarised 
as follows: 
The Quality Dailies 
The Scotsman. Owned by the Thomson Organisation. Published 
in Edinburgh. Circulation 90,000. Tradi.tionally in favour of some 
form of Home Rule or federalism. Critical of aspects of the 
Scotland Act but campaigned ardently for "Yes" vote. 
The Glasgow Herald. Owned by George Outram & Company, 
itself owned by Scottish & Unj.versal Investments (SUITS) which, 
throughout the referendum campaign, was the object of a take-
over bid (subsequently successful) by Lonrho. Published in Glas-
gow. Circulation 115,000. Formerly anti-devolutionist and always 
referred to "assembly" with a lower case "a". After conversion 
of SUITS' then chairman, Sir Hugh Fraser, to Scottish nationalism 
in 1974, attacks on nationalists were muted. Latterly supported 
devolution though with more resignation than zeal. 
The Popular Tabloids 
The Scottish Daily Express. Owned by Express Newspapers, 
owned in turn by Trafalgar House Investments. Formerly pro-
devolutionist. Founder Lord Beaverbrook had flirted with early 
Scottish Nationalism. Expressions of Scottishness intensified when 
publication moved to Manchester in 1974. Following Trafalgar 
House take-over, switched to militant anti-devolution line. 
The Daily Record. Part of Mirror Group Newspapers, owned by 
Reed International. Published in Glasgow. Circulation 700,000. 
Pro-Labour but favoured devolution even before Labour Party 
convinced. Enthusiastic "Yes" campaigner. 
The Regional Dailies 
The Courier & Advertiser (Dundee). Owned by D. C. Thomson, 
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a private local company. Circulation 135,000. Traditional, old-
fashioned paper. Has consistently opposed devolution. 
The Press & Journal <Aberdeen). Owned by Thomson Organis-
ation. Circulation 115,000. Low interest in devolution. Generally 
adopted stance of unenthusiastic neutrality. 
The Sundays 
The Sunday Post. Ownership as Dundee Courier. Published in 
Glasgow. Grculation undisclosed but believed to be over one 
million. Was suspicious of the devolution proposals but believed 
some sort of change necessary. Had difficulty in reconciling strong 
Scottish consciousness with innate conservatism. 
The Sunday Mail. Ownership as Daily Record. Published in 
Glasgow. Circulation 800,000. Most nationalist of the Scottish 
press. Fervent and colourful "Yes" campaign. 
The Scottish Sunday Express. Ownership as Scottish Daily 
Express. Published in Manchester. Little interest in Scottish 
affairs and little attention given to devolution - and that very 
hostile. 
The Scottish Morning Press: 
Coverage of the Referendum Campaign 
The coverage of the referendum campaign has been studied for 
the seven months commencing on 1 August 1978, when the Royal 
Assent was granted to the Scotland BiH and ending on 1 March 
1979 when a referendum was held in Scotland in which voters 
were asked whether they wished the Scotland Act to be imple-
mented, an argument which was presented chiefly in terms of 
whether an Assembly should be set up in Edinburgh. Those in 
favour of an Assembly secured a narrow majority but failed 
to win the support of 40% of the electorate which would have 
ensured its establishment automatically. 
The definition of such a period is inevitably arbitrary but 
the inclusion of earlier periods was beyond the scope of this 
study. The limited evidence avaiJable suggests that popular feeling 
on devolution remained relatively constant during the legislative 
stages but changed significantly during the period under con-
sideration. 
The Scottish morning Press covered the referendum cam-
paign in different ways, not only in terms of political advocacy 
but also in terms of the extent and style of coverage. Indeed 
THE PRESS AND THE REFERENDUM 67 
the approaches adopted were so varied that the tendency to 
regard the Scottish Press as homogeneous deserves to be ques-
tioned. This is in itself a finding worth emphasising here and 
testing in further studies of the British Press. 
Space Allocated 
There was a great variation in the space allocated to the 
referendum. The traditional measure of space is the column inch. 
The papers surveyed had a wide range of page sizes, column 
width and type faces, making valid comparison difficult, and 
space allocated has therefore been expressed as a percentage of 
the total editorial space available in each paper. Editorial space 
is defined as being all the space in the paper other than adver-
tisements and advertising features. Table A shows the percentage 
of editorial space in each paper allocated to the referendum 
month by month. 
Two extremes are recorded. The Scotsman is pre-eminent in 
its coverage wi,th 3.5%. In February this rose to a remarkable 
13%: in a typical twenty-page Scotsman this would mean be-
tween a page and a page and a half devoted to the subject. On 
some days the figure was well above that. At the other extreme 
the contribution of the Scottish Sunday Express is negligible at 
0.2% and, being statistically worthless, will be omitted from much 
of the ensuing discussion and tables. The other papers cluster 
round the 1 o/o mark. If the papers are ordered by allocation of 
space and their referendum stance noted, an interesting pattern 
emerges. Table B shows that support for devolution is associated 
with higher coverage. 
The Build Up of Coverage 
Table A also demonstrates the build-up of coverage which 
predictably increases as referendum day approaches. But the 
pattern of build-up varies with different papers. Table C, which 
expresses Table A in index form, shows this more clearly. The 
Scotsman, Glasgow Herald and Dundee Courier all stepped up 
coverage in November when the referendum date was announced. 
All the press except the regionals stepped up coverage in January 
79, and all nine papers stepped up coverage in February. For 
the Press & Journal this was the only significant acceleration. 
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Coverage devoted to the referendum expressed as percentage of total 
editorial space in each paper. 
month S'man G.Her. D.Rec. 
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Growth in coverage of the referendum. 100 in each case equals February 
percentage of total editorial space for that paper. This table presents 
table A in index form. 
month S'man. G.Her. D.Rec. SDE. DC. P&J. SP. SM 
Aug 78 9 7 5 1 14 2 5 6 
Sept lU 7 7 0 8 3 3 0 
Oct 5 6 7 0 2 1 8 0 
Nov 18 13 7 4 25 9 8 4 
Dec 11 13 6 1 26 6 6 2 
Jan 79 34 31 13 34 28 7 17 39 
Feb 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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TABLED 
Readers' letters as percentage of total items on referendum 
Total Letters 
Paper items N o/o 
Scotsman 834 49.3 
Glasgow Herald 300 47.7 
Daily Record 161 9.3 
Sc. Daily Express 163 30.7 
Dundee Courier 211 63.5 
Press & Journal 218 30.7 
Sunday Post 59 5.1 
Sunday Mail 30 6.7 
TABLEE 
Readers' letters on referendum, by orientation, as percentage of all letters 
carried on all subjects, N. 
letters, all total ref pro anti other 
paper topics N letters o/o devo o/o devo% devo o/o 
Scotsman 2018 20.4 9.1 5.1 6.2 
G.Herald 1720 8.3 2.9 3.4 2.0 
D.Record 1428 1.1 1.0 • 0.0 
S.D. Express 1090 4.6 0.9 3.6 • 
D.Courier 1534 8.7 4.6 2.7 1.4 
P&J 188 35.6 15.4 14.9 5.3 
S.Post 369 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.5 
S.Mail 260 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.4 
*less than 0.05% 
TABLE F 
Distribution, by types of coverage, of all referendum items, other than 
readers' letters 
total page one other inside leader feature/ column/ 
itemsN lead P.1 news comment diary forum 
paper o/o o/o o/o o/o o/o o/o 
Scotsman 423 2.36 8.27 65.24 9.45 12.29 2.36 
G. Herald 157 4.45 12.73 46.49 13.37 14.01 8.91 
D.Record 146 2.05 2.05 24.65 4.10 65.06 2.05 
S.D.Express 113 6.19 10.61 48.67 6.19 25.66 2.65 
D.Courier 77 5.19 6.49 62.33 20.77 2.59 2.59 
P&J 151 1.98 15.23 66.88 2.64 10.59 2.64 
S.Post 56 0.00 1.78 5.35 5.35 83.92 3.57 
S.Mail 28 3.57 0.00 17.85 3.57 67.85 7.14 
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The Style of Coverage 
While it is customary and useful to compare coverage in 
terms of space allocated, such a method fails to reveal the 
different forms of coverage which can be employed. During the 
seven-month period a count was kept on all referendum items 
appearing in the press. "Item" here includes news stories, feature 
articles, letters, opinion columns and so on. As Table D shows, 
readers' letters constitute a sizeable proportion of the i.tems 
occurring in some papers. All the papers, except the Press & 
Journal, carry large numbers of letters. Letters on the referendum 
made up nearly half the total items occurring in The Scotsman 
and the Glasgow Herald and over 60% in the Dundee Courier. 
In The Scotsman a fifth of all letters carried concerned devolu-
tion, a considerable proportion gi.ven the other Scottish, British 
and foreign issues which receive attention. Despite lively readers' 
pages the tabloids and Sundays carried few letters on the referen-
dum. Most of these carried in the Express were in response to a 
competition for antir-devolution letters in which first prize was 
£100! The absence of referendum letters from the Sunday Post 
is interesting in the light of the finding of the recent Royal 
Commission on the Press that the letters page was the paper's 
most popular feature. As Table E shows, there was no consistent 
connection between editorial slant and the dominant view ex-
pressed by letters. The predominant view reflected editorial 
stances in the pro-Assembly Scotsman and the anti-Assembly 
Express and went against editorial preference in the pro-Assembly 
Herald and anti-Assembly Courier. The category "other" in 
Table E consists of letters dealing with devolution or referendums 
elsewhere, those failing to express a preference, and those which 
were simply obscure. 
The distribution of items other than readers' letters is shown 
in Table F. The "page one lead" is the main front-page story 
and provides a useful indication of editorial priorities. A number 
of the Express leads were not news but campaign exhortations. 
On several occasions the Herald led on polls it had commissioned. 
There is obviously more scope for "other page one" news in 
papers such as the Press & Journal which carry a large number 
of front-page stories. The tabloids rarely carry more than two. 
The Dundee Courier carries only advertising on the front page: 
for the purpose of this study the main news page was regarded 
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as page one. "Inside news" refers to all other news reports 
including occasional back-page news. The Herald is here under-
represented since it ran each day's referendum news into one 
long item while The Scotsman ran each topic separately. If 
allowance were made for this practice the Herald would probably 
join the regionals and The Scotsman with inside news around 
the 60% mark. 
The Sunday Post rarely treated the referendum as hard 
news and confined most reporting to impressionistic accounts in 
its Parliamentary diary column. The papers differed widely in 
the use made of this diary-type coverage which interpreted and 
analysed aspects of the news. In the Daily Record much material 
regarded as ordinary news by other papers was treated in this 
manner. Most papers devoted feature space to detailing the 
issues, background, implementation and possible consequences 
of the referendum. Only the Dundee Courier failed to make 
significant use of this category of journalism whose growth has 
been identified as the major change in newspaper content over 
recent decades3• Most papers made use of the contributed article 
or column by outsiders. The Glasgow Herald in particular has 
long made use of this device and along with the Courier and the 
Sunday Post sometimes paired contributors with opposing views 
on the same page. Most contributors were partisan to the 
referendum debate but some use was made of outside experts, 
to discuss either particular aspects of devolution or the political 
significance of the referendum. 
The Scotsman, the Herald and the Courier carry several 
leading articles or "editorial comment" articles every day and 
made frequent pronouncements on devolution and the referen-
dum. The other papers usually carry only one editorial, not 
necessarily every day. The Sunday Post's "As We See It" column 
is less a reasoned statement of editorial opinion than an anec-
dotal rumination on events. 
The various members of the Scottish morning Press thus 
allocated varying percentages of their editorial space to devolu-
tion and the referendum, built up their coverage at different 
speeds, and employed widely di.ffering editorial techniques to 
cover the subject. It remains to examine the aspects of devolution 
which were covered. 
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The Agenda of Referendum Coverage 
The agenda of issues covered by the Press fell into three 
distinct categories: the campaign itself; the details of the devo-
lution proposals; and the anticipated consequences of devolution 
going ahead - or not. The campaign attracted the usual horse-
race excitement of an election. Ini,tial speculation on the date 
of the referendum was followed by speculation on the result. 
Several papers carried opinion polls and they were all eager to 
report each other's findings. There were novel features in the 
referendum campaign related to the requirement that 40% of 
the Scottish electorate must vote "yes" if a motion repealing 
the Scotland Act were not to be laid before Parliament, and to 
the fact that the campaign groups cut across trad~tional party 
allegiances. 
The 40% requirement aroused much controversy - about 
the justice of the rule and about the allowance made for in-
accuracies on the register - and much speculation about 
whether the requirement would be met. The splits in the Labour 
and Conservative Parties over devolution and the fact that 
neither Labour faction would work with members of other 
parties produced not only a surfeit of campaign groups but a 
wealth of activities and feuds to report. Political person-
alities found themselves in unlikely and newsworthy alliances; 
there were predictable allegations of deceit and trickery 
and one instance of infiltration when the press talked 
hopefully but vainly of a Scottish Watergate. The financ· 
ing of the campaign brought some sharp Press exchanges 
and the wealthiest group - "Scotland says No" - was 
accused on occasion of using Arab money and (probably 
more damagingly) funds from England. The unusual align-
ments posed problems for the broadcasting authorities with 
their statutory requirement to be impartial. The Press, un-
hindered by such requirements, followed the ensuing disputes and 
court cases with enthusiasm. 
The party leaders were scrutinised and when Mr Callaghan 
came to Glasgow campaigning for the Assembly, five of the six 
dailies led their front pages with the story. It is worth recording 
that this was the first time in the seven-month period that so 
many dailies agreed on a devolution lead. The Press, thrown by 
the odd campaign alignments and suspecting a lack of public 
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enthusiasm for the subject, tended to fall back on the familiar 
fare of journalism. This search for personalities rather than 
abstract issues led both sides to list well-known names in politics, 
industry, sports and entertainment who supported them, prompt-
ing one terse and weary three-word letter to The Scotsman: 
"Who is Lulu?" 
One intriguing sideshow was the conflict between the 
papers. Since its move to Manchester in 1974 the Scottish Daily 
Express had been sensitive to any questionmg of its Scottishness. 
With its switch to an anti-Assembly stance the sensitivity was 
heightened. The pro-Assembly Record challenged the right of 
the Express to claim to speak for Scotland. The Express replied 
that the Record was English owned; its editor was even an 
Englishman! Much energy- and front-page space- was spent 
in late January on the subject, bringing a rare knock-about 
element to Scottish journalism though little enlightenment to the 
readers. In more restrained vein The Scotsman drily reported the 
failure of the Express to publish a poll it had commissioned on the 
referendum. The poll had shown a surprisingly strong "yes" vote. 
The details of devolution were dutifully reported. All the 
Press at some point or other listed the substance of the Scotland 
Act, what was devolved and what would be retained by West-
minster. Much space was given to pictures of the hall prepared 
for the Assembly, the cost of preparation was discussed and 
there was some speculation on its use in the event of the 
Assembly failing to materialise. The events leading up to the 
Assembly were recounted: the Herald had a useful account going 
back a few decades, the Record and Sunday Mail delved farther, 
and more selectively, into ancient Scottish history. 
The Consequences 
Much Press coverage tended to view the referendum vote 
as an end in itself but there was some speculation on the after-
math of devolution. The "No" campaigners hammered on the 
themes that the Act was a bad piece of legislation, it would 
mean more bureaucracy and higher taxes, and might lead to the 
break-up of Britain. The papers in Dundee and Aberdeen also 
suggested an Assembly would be dominated by the central belt 
and hence the Socialists. The force with which this negative 
case was put pushed the "Yes" campaigners on the defensive. 
That the Act was bad they sometimes conceded - "But the 
F 
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best you'll get". That Britain could break-up was conceded 
implicitly, for why else were those seeking Scottish independence 
backing the Assembly? On the positive side the "Yes" campaign-
ers could argue that democracy would be brought nearer the 
people who would be given more control over government. 
These however were abstract notions: there was a noticeable 
failure on the part of "Yes" campaigners to present a vivid and 
attractive image of post-Assembly Scotland. The Scotsman did 
run a series of leaders, "Agenda for the Assembly", which 
described what the Assembly might do. Several papers based 
articles on the newly published collection of essays Framework 
for Change4, among them Neal Ascherson's humorous and 
human description of the Assembly at work. The Glasgow Herald 
and the Press & l ournal touched on relations between the Assem-
bly and a range of interests - the arts, industry, the regions -
but these were far from frequent. For the most part the "Yes" 
campaigners were more concerned to rebut the grim future 
forecast by opponents than present their own version. It was 
left to the pro-Assembly Press to try to put some life into the idea. 
The Effects of Press Coverage: An Assessment 
Conventional election studies are accustomed to recording 
the allegiance and activities of the Press during the campaign. 
The implication is that the Press is in some way important but 
the issue is rarely taken beyond this point5• Political activists 
and journalists frequently question the role of the Press but 
while often asserting its irrelevance they behave as though it 
was important. 
The problem is a complex one. It is worth emphasising 
that in a modern mass society few people can witness politics at 
first-hand and even those poHtically active cannot survey the 
entire political environment unaided. The mass media are not 
a sideshow to events: they are the major means of observing 
most events and are often influential in shaping them. For the 
ordinary elector the mass media are a major means of surveying 
the political world, ei.ther directly or through discussion with 
those who have used the media. s Moreover in a modern society 
the media themselves are actors on the scene with their own 
interests to pursue. 7 
The political effects of mass media are still imperfectly 
understood. We are emerging from a period of pessimism during 
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which it was often suggested that the media, for the most part, 
had the effect of reinforcing existing attitudes. The subject still 
suffers from the 'hypodermic" approach of early theorists who 
postulated an inert audience responding to injections of 
information from the media. This has led to dangerous over-
simplifications. Until quite recently analysts of election Press 
coverage would add up the circulations of papers supporting 
each contestant and conclude that the recipient of the largest 
favourable Press was the beneficiary! 
An extensive reassessment of the effect of the Press, radio 
and television has taken place in the 1970s.s Not only is the 
possibility of their power and influence being re-admitted but 
effects are now being sought and identified in a wide range of 
directions. In a resume of this length only three can be noted, 
being of particular value. 
1. Effects on institutions and elite groups. 
2. Effects on other media. 
3. Effects on individuals' political behaviour. 
The first two will be touched on only briefly. 
Institutions and Elites 
The Press, radio and television and certain prestige sources 
in particular are used by other groups and elites to monitor 
opinion in contexts where their first-hand knowledge is inade-
quate. This was the case over Scottish devolution where many 
British politicians, party workers, journalists, civil servants and 
other opinion leaders had to come to a conclusion on the 
strength of Scottish demands for devolution, making up thei.r 
minds in a relatively short period. The prestige Scottish Press 
available in London consists of The Scotsman and the Glasgow 
Herald. The Scotsman has always favoured some form of 
devolution and appears to give more space to the subject than 
wider-circulating dvals. This impression has been borne out 
by the present study. 
In the mid-1970s when Government policy formulation was 
at a critical stage, anyone consulting the four Scottish nationally-
circulating papers would have found a concerted demand for 
devolution.9 (The Express subsequently recanted: The anti-
devolutionist Dundee Courier is not readily available in London 
and anyhow has a reputation for eccentric views. In as much as the 
Press of an area influence decision-makers by providing a surro-
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gate version of public opinion, the better known Scottish Press, 
right up to the referendum itself, would have been providing an 
over-estimate of Scottish enthusiasm for devolution. 
Effects on Other Media 
The environment surveyed by any member of the media 
includes all other media and their activities. The claims of rival 
papers made news for each other, so too did their polls. The 
difficulties of the broadcasters balancing the debate made news. 
Any action by one newspaper or broadcasting organisation is 
liable to affect others. Journalists lack audience feedback or the 
opportunity to test their image of their audience.1° Instead they 
write to a large extent for the approval of other journalists and 
judge their own work by the performance of others. Thus it is 
very difficult for any newspaper to ignore persistently a topic 
given extensive coverage by rivals. The Daily Record failed to 
report the launching of the small but controversial "Labour 
Vote No" organisation but once it received coverage from other 
papers, assisted by the publicising flair of its leaders, the Record 
quickly gave it mention. Conversely if a paper raises an issue 
it tends to find its way onto the agenda of other papers or of 
radio and television by direct report, or because they attack it, 
or, under pressure for fresh news, develop a new angle.ll In 
Britain the requirement on broadcasters to display balance 
enables viewpoints which might be excluded by a partisan Press 
to get onto the agenda nevertheless. 
Moreover, once a new topic is linked to people or 
institutions already on the media agenda its coverage is assured. 
Thus whenever the referendum campaign was taken up by 
well-known politicians, Parliament, the courts, the Church of 
Scotland and the established parties, it was assured of coverage. 
This process enabled one paper, or a group with access to 
one paper, to feed an item onto the agenda of the rest of the 
Press. The arguments for and against were thus carried (if only 
to be attacked) by papers of all persuasions. This process should 
serve as a salutory warning to those bemused by the simplistic 
image of papers for and against a topic, or by the fact that the 
average reader has access to only one newspaper. Thus although 
the homogeneity of the Scottish Press has been questioned in 
this paper, the tendency towards a homogeneous agenda should 
be emphasised. 
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Effects on Individuals' Political Behaviour 
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"Media effects" are regularly taken, in colloquial usage, to 
mean effects on the audience. The impact of mass communica-
tions on their recipients has, traditionally. been the area of the 
subject which has generated most interest. In the absence of 
any comprehensive model relating mass media to political 
behaviour there is no justification for asserting that the Scottish 
Press "caused" any particular development in Scottish political 
behaviour.12 However, much work is underway exploring the link 
between Press and politics and two developments in particular 
shed useful light on the referendum coverage. They concern the 
concepts of "agenda-setting" and the "spiral of silence'''. 
The study of agenda-setting is concerned with the conse-
quences of a media system which, from an infinite range of 
available data, extracts and disseminates a very particular 
selection of information and news.l3 It has been said that the 
mass media are not very good at telling people what to think 
but very successful at telling them what to think about. Research 
on agenda-setting has sought to demonstrate that people exposed 
to the media's agenda will, over time, modify their personal 
agenda of important issues to conform to the media's agenda. 
This has been found to occur in certain limited circumstances. 
However, implicit in the concept of agenda-setting is that of 
'arena-setting". The notion of arena-setting but not the term is 
alluded to by McLeod et al when they say: "To the extent that 
the agenda, as set by the media, forces political campaign 'games' 
to be played in a 'court' more favourable to one candidate than 
another, the effect may be to change not only the 'action' but 
also the outcome of the contest. "14 
Whether or not the audience internalises the media's agenda, 
the items on the agenda consti.tute the arena in which political 
debate is conducted. Contestants certainly behave as though this 
was the case and political campaigners make great efforts to 
push favourable issues onto the agenda and keep unfavourable 
issues off it. If the referendum agenda presented by the Scottish 
Press is viewed as an arena it is possible to postulate which side 
succeeded in establishing favourable issues on the agenda, or, 
to put it another way, which side could show itself to most 
advantage in the arena set up by the Scottish Press. 
The main items on the agenda were described above. The 
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issues covered by the Press fell into three distinct categories: 
the campaign itself, the details of the devolution proposal, and 
the consequences. These will be considered in reverse order. 
When it came to forecasting the consequences of devolution 
the "No" campaigners set the pace. The "Yes" campaigners 
spent much time and energy disputing charges of increased 
costs, more bureaucracy and the break-up of Britain, thus com-
peting in the arena set up by their opponents. In contrast the 
"Yes" campaigners were singularly unsuccessful in using the 
Press to sustain a positive debate on post-devolution Scotland-
despite the sporadic efforts of The Scotsman. 
The "Yes" campaigners turned instead to the familiar motive 
power of tartanry and much of the pro-devolution Press took up 
the theme. One of the "Yes" campaigns launched its. final push 
with a pub Press conference at which pressmen were supplied 
with haggis and whisky as well as Press releases. Had there been 
an Edinburgh pub called the 'Kailyard" the "Yes" campaigners 
would doubtless have used it. The Daily Record and Sunday Mail 
resuscitated their own versions of Scottish history and in Whig 
style presented a "Yes" vote as the logical redress to the 1707 
Act of Union or consequence of the 1314 Battle of Bannock-
burn. On the eve of poll the Record readers were reminded: 
"Now's the day, and now's the hour" (a quotation from "Bruce's 
Address to his Army at Bannockburn" by Robert Burns). Thus 
were three of nationalism's more potent symbols invoked in one 
familiar line. The Scotsman found time to ponder the voting 
intentions of Sir Walter Scott and sparked some lively correspon-
dence from readers undeterred by the fact that he had been 
dead some 150 years. 
Lasswell, writing on nationalism, has observed: -
"The rationalism of capitalism has rendered it peculiarly 
dependent for positive values, ethical imperatives and unifying 
goal symbols upon legacies from previous cultures. "15 
His observation was certainly supported by the Scottish 
Press content in 1979. Of the trim, modern, self-sufficient 
Scandinavian-style Scotland which once inspired Home Rulers 
nothing was heard during the referendum campaign above the 
skirl of nostalgia and the jeremiads of old-style unionism. In 
terms of arena-setting, two themes for debate were laid down: 
one extrapolated from past experience of rising costs and growing 
bureaucracy and exploited the ingrained antipathy of the 
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majority to total independence and the break-up of Bdtain: the 
other made a yearning appeal to the deep-rooted sense of 
Scottish consciousness. 
No data exists to determine which side benefited from these 
arena issues: in future and more sophisticated studies of media 
effects, methods will have to be devised to evaluate the scale 
and di["ection of any benefit derived from the composition of 
the agenda. However, at the level of informed interpretation, it 
can be said that prophecies of more government generating 
more bureaucracy and a higher tax-burden would, given the 
audience's experience, appear to have a certain credibility. The 
forecast of the break-up of Britain would, on the continuing 
evidence of opinion polls, alienate more voters than it would 
attract. And the stressing of Scottish consciousness and traditions 
would in no way guarantee a distinctively Scottish form of 
poHtical behaviour. Research has suggested that there is no lack 
of Scottish awareness or pride in the cultural heritage, but it 
has also been shown that there has been no consistent link 
between this Scottish awareness and political behaviour.16 
The detail of the Scotland Act also featured on the agenda. 
The only evidence of possible effect is derived from an ORC/ 
Scotsman poll which reported the awareness of voters on the 
devolution proposals.17 Each devolved topic was only recognised 
as being devolved by roughly half the sample and even among 
"Yes" voters 34% believed police powers were to be devolved 
and 18%, taxation, although neither was to have been an 
Assembly function. 
All the Press in the sample took the trouble to provide 
factual information on devolution but it accounted for a very 
small fraction of the total coverage and could obviously be 
overlooked. Much attention was given to the hall prepared for 
the Assembly in Edinburgh and this attracted speculation on 
its use if the Assembly failed to materialise. The preparation of 
the hall also implied the Government's pre-emption of the 
voters' decision. This point, however, was raised only occasionally 
in anti-devolution letters. 
The campaign itself was prominent on the agenda. It in-
cluded the controversy over the 40% rule, the role of the 
political big names, the activities of the various campaign groups, 
and the shifts in public opinion. 
The 40% rule served as a focal issue in two ways. For 
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the "Yes" campaigners it was a symbol of grievance and West-
minster trickery. The Scotsman referred to the "rigged election". 
Secondly, in the speculation on the outcome, the 40% require-
ment was a novel point of discussion. In this respect it posed 
a trap for the "Yes" side. On the evidence of their own claims 
and of opinion polls up to the autumn of 1978, support for 
devolution was overwhelming and 40% represented no threat. 
But as a grievance issue it was irresistable - there were points 
to be scored off the ethics of the requirement, off injustices in the 
register, and the effects of abstentions. Attention thus settled 
on the 40% requirement, on the outcome of the poll and on 
signs of changing fortunes on either side. The "yes" side's 
claims that the 40% rule could wreck devolution could be in-
terpreted by "No" voters as an indication that they might 
succeed. 
At this point the concept of the "spiral of silence" can 
usefully be introduced. The concept postulates that public opinion 
is based on a "quasi-statistical sense" whereby individuals seek 
to keep themselves integrated in society by monitoring the 
climate of opinion and giving voice to those of their predisposi-
tions they believe to be in the ascendant.lB The idea is more 
sophisticated than the notion of band-wagonning. People do not 
embrace a new idea because it is seen to be popular, rather 
they assert a hitherto dormant predisposition because they 
believe it is now acceptable to do so. By the reverse process 
less currency is given to opinions deemed to be in decline. The 
spiral theory allows the existence of committed elements at both 
extremes of an opinion who will not be moved and are immune 
to changes in the climate of opinion: the spiral effect is dis-
played by the middle ground whose range of predispositions 
is such that they are potential supporters of either side. 
In the period of the study the climate of opinion as presen-
ted by the morning Press showed the anti-devolution tendency 
to be on the advance. Through most of 1978 the level of support 
for the Assembly remained, according to the opinion polls, 
relatively constant, enjoying the endorsement of two-thirds of 
those offering an opinion.l9 As the campaign developed the gap 
narrowed until by polling day it was virtually a dead heat.2o 
The development of the campaign is worth noting. The 
"No" campaigners were slower to organise and later in the 
field. So too were those papers opposed to devolution or neutral 
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on the subject. Although most people read only one paper 
the point has already been made that papers influence each other. 
This slow build-up was pointed out by several anti-devolutionists 
early in the campaign who noted that their case was still to 
be put. Given that, it was predictable that once criticism of 
the devolution plan was finally made, there was likely to be 
some slippage of the "Yes" support. If the spiral concept was 
operating then it could be expected that this slippage would 
accelerate. In such circumstances the opinion polls were likely 
to reflect the changes and, in as much as they are one indication 
of the climate of opinion, were liable to feed the process. Other 
aspects of the agenda may have been relevant to the spiral 
process. Much attention was given to the big names, particularly 
the Government Ministers who campaigned. The Labour Yes 
Campaign linked its publicity directly with the Prime Minister. 
But in the process it may have forged a link with another spiral 
- the declining fortunes being experienced by the Government 
over the winter period of serious industrial disputes.21 The 
coverage, frequently alarmist, given to these disputes during the 
devolution campaign is a further possible media effect to be 
noted. It cannot be expanded upon in this study but it empha-
sises the danger of analysing the Press coverage of the one 
item in isolation. 
There was also much emphasis on other names. Both sides 
capitalised on well-known supporters though latterly the "No" 
campaign made most use of the device. The Daily Record 
grumbled about impressionable voters hitching themselves to a 
star. This complaint missed the point. Committed devolutionists 
were not going to forsake their allegiance to follow a pop-star, 
football hero or captain of industry. But for the less certain 
these public declarations demonstrated that other people had 
doubts and, while Scottish, could oppose the Assembly. The 
publicity legitimated a point of view and gave substance to a 
current of opinion. In the early part of the period the anti-
Assembly reader of most papers might have believed he was 
on his own. By the end of the campaign this impression would 
have been dispelled. 
One final paragraph must be devoted to the question of 
editorial comment or leader columns - popularly regarded as 
the voice of a paper. The impact of editorial opinion on other 
institutions and elites has been noted, but there is no evidence 
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to suggest that such columns themselves influence readers. A 
major contribution to the study of media effects has been the 
recognition that audience members use the Press, radio and 
television for many different reasons - entertainment, informa-
tion, social status among them. Some people do seek reinforce-
ment of their own views but others, who may buy the paper 
rather for sports news or car adverts or local gossip, may use 
the paper's political position much as a navigator may be 
acquainted with a landmark but will never visit it. Papers are 
associated with a cluster of views and their position on a new 
topic will be interpreted in the context of their existing views. 
In Dundee for example, the Labour movement, in backing 
devolution, made the connection that the Dundee Courier, anti-
trade union and anti-socialist, was also anti-devolution. 
Conclusion 
It is worth repeating that, given the present understanding 
of the subject, there is no ready means of assessing the effect 
of the Scottish morning Press on the referendum campaign. 
There is, however, a growing awareness that the Press performs 
a central role in the political process and is potentially of great 
influence. 
The role of the Scottish Press in presenting to outsiders an 
image of Scotland more passionately devolutionist than the 
popular vote indicated, has already been noted. It has also main-
tained devolution on the agenda of political issues and provided 
a forum for the development of the subject. These are both 
considerable effects. 
As for effects on the electorate, the agenda-setting function 
and the spiral of silence have both been found to· operate in 
certain circumstances with certain people. If they were operat-
ing in the referendum campaign it can be argued that the more 
likely beneficiary in each case was the "No" campaign. This 
observation contrasts with the pro-devolution stance of the 
majority of the Scottish Press and serves as a warning against 
confusing media effects with media intentions. A study of the 
Scottish Press on any future political occasion could usefully 
develop the concepts of agenda-setting and the spiral of silence. 
There is no reason to suppose that these and other explanations 
of behaviour need be mutually exclusive. There may well be 
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a complex of effects in operation on such occasions with different 
aspects of media activity affecting different groups of audience 
members. The very limited assessment possible on this occasion 
should, however, serve notice that the traditional approach of 
cataloguing the Press and its declared positions contributes little 
to understanding the effects on political behaviour. 
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